The contributions to this volume are illustrative of the fact that after a period of decline of interest at the end of the seventies. structuralist and constructivist approaches to cognitive development are once again flourishing. What accounts for this resurgence? Part of the explanation is that the competing approaches have also, in turn, revealed their own shortcomings. The revitalization of neo-nativist theories was grounded in a host of experiments reporting early success on tasks that Piaget considered to be indicative of the presence of operational structures. Subsequently, however, it became apparent that subtle changes in the situation made early successes possible. These changes also led to changes in the nature of the processes implemented in problem solving. This fact pointed to the limitations of an approach that attributes success at different ages and in different situations to one and the same innate structure. Such an approach leaves open the question of what high-level problem solving depends on.
The functionalist approach to this question was to propose much more fine-grained models of subjects' information-processing strategies in performing high-level developmental tasks. However, this approach failed to provide an explanation, or even a convincing description, of the mechanism of change, i.e., of development. The artificial information-processing systems that these models draw heavily upon have remained unproductive in this respect and provide few cues to enhance our understanding of the problem.
Although the neo-nativist and functionalist approaches to development [Kail, 1986 [Kail, , 1988 .
Although both the structuralist method, and the conceptual framework of developmental discontinuity that goes with it, have been preserved in the new neo-structuralist approaches, the structures themselves differ. Groupings introduce reversible relations on the level of concrete operations, and the INRC group formalizes, on the level of formal operations, the coordinations of two previously independent types of reversibility (negation and reciprocity).
The three differences between classical structuralist and neo-structuralist theory that have been described imply that, although the notion of structure has been preserved, its definition departs considerably from the original one. Hence, the label 'neo-structuralist' is warranted. To take a concrete example, when a child, in order to judge quantity, is able to take into account something else other than the level of the liquid, how does he or she choose to be attentive to the shape of the vessel rather than to the nature of the liquid (e.g., its color or its temperature)?
This problem would not bother the contributors to this volume if they were preformists. In this case they would reply that the relationship was prewired. Nor would the question arise if they were empiricists. They would answer that each of these specific relations was imposed by the environment. But the question should bother constructivists, since they believe that at least some of these relations are actively constructed by the subject. Inasmuch as it is not possible for individuals to form all the combinations of all the schemes available in their repertories, to find the most appropriate response, one constructivist solution to this problem is to assume that the individual has a set of heuristics or expectations that bound the search space. To cut a long story short, while a symbolic mode of processing may well be implemented in the construction of new structures, I do not believe that it can self-generate heuristics that allow it to surpass itself [Lautrey, 1981 [Lautrey, , 1987 [Lautrey, ,1990 . In other words, the mechanisms involved in the construction of new structures probably bring several modes of processing into play, and some of these modes are likely to interact.
I ndiv i dual D iJfer ence s
The distinctions made by Fischer, Hoppe-Graff and de Ribaupierre to describe the different sorts of individual differences that can be identified show that the issue of individual differences has evolved considerably on both the conceptual and methodological levels. Indeed, this is one of the major points of the volume, as indicated by its title. I shall not discuss differences in rate, which are recognized and handled by all theories, but turn directly to the issue of differences in pathways. The hypothesis of different pathways is not compatible with Piagetian structuralism unless it is restricted to the preparatory phases of a stage [Longeot, 1978] . Yet [Lautrey, 1987 [Lautrey, , 1990 Lautrey et al., 1981 Lautrey et al., . 1986 Rieben et al., 19901. This distinction might be relevant in differentiating the 'logical' and 'infralogical' processing described by de Research in real-world settings in which subjects have prior knowledge has prompted researchers to stress a parallel mode of processing, which gives rise to the formation of analog representations such as prototypes, schemas, or mental images. Here, the whole seems to precede identification of the parts. For example, the formation of a script apparently precedes the ability to isolate the events that compose it [Nelson, 1985] .
The imaginal representation of a rotation of an object precedes the ability to order the successive states it passes through fl-autrey and Chartier, 19901 . The formation of a prototype may precede the ability to isolate the defining attributes of the category [Rosch, 1983] . Analogical representations apparently preserve, in an intrinsic fashion [Palmer, 1978] have been able to construct initially but which can be used by the system to abstract rules that permit it to reconstruct the order in a controlled fashion.
A source of cognitive development may lie in the self-organizingdynamics emerging from the interaction between different modes of processing, each of which modifîes the unfolding of the other [Lautrey, 1990] .
The issue of individual differences also gains from being analyzed in terms of the relations between different modes of processing of information. The development of a preference for one or the other mode when they are in competition may alter the nature of their interactions. Such preferences may be the source of inter-individual variation in the order and the nature of acquisitions and may thus give rise to different pathways in cognitive development.
The neo-structuralist approach emphasizes aspects of cognitive functioning related to the symbolic mode of processing. In this respect, the approach remains close both to Piaget's 
